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CONFISCATION OF ENEMY PRIVATE PROPERTY
The large amount of enemy private property in the custody of
the Alien Property Custodian has given rise to numerous suggestions
as to the disposal of the property. Among others, the suggestion has
been made that the proceeds derived from its sale be used to pay
the claims of American citizens against the German government, leav-
ing the German owners to look to their own government for reim-
bursement, that government to retain for this purpose the proceeds of
American private property in Germany. While there is a certain
rough equity in the suggestion, the claims will probably not offset
each other, with the result that certain private citizens may suffer a
practical confiscation of their property. The final disposition of the
enemy property will doubtless be determined by the Peace Conference
or by our Congress, and in the solution of the matter consideration
probably will be given to the possible effect of a policy of confisca-
tion, appropriation or forced sale upon the security of foreign invest-
ments generally, to which American citizens are being encouraged to
devote renewed energy. In the meantime, it may be in order briefly
[478]
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to review from the standpoint of international law the status of
enemy private property in time of war.
In Roman times and in the Middle Ages, it was established practice
to confiscate the private property of enemy subjects both in conquered
territory and at home. Up to the French Revolution, indeed, it was
considered one of the normal aims of war to enrich the State and
impoverish the enemy by despoiling his individual subjects in con-
quered territory.' That political and social upheaval gave official
birth to the new theory, foreshadowed by Montesquieu and Rousseau,
that war is primarily a relation between State and State, that individ-
uals are enemies only accidentally and that their private property in
conquered territory should be immune from capture and confiscation.
Whatever legal inaccuracy this theory of the relation of individuals
to the enemy State may contain, modern codes of land warfare have
incorporated this humane rule,2 although the loose and discretionary
practice involved in requisitions and contributions still gives consid-
erable scope for deviation from the principle of immunity. With
respect to private enemy ships at sea and contraband goods even under
a neutral flag, modern practice still regards their seizure and confisca-
tion as lawful. The traditional policy of the United States to bring
about the immunity of enemy ships was negotiated into treaties by
Franklin, Jefferson and Adams, and by Secretary Fish,8 and has been
re-enunciated on various occasions by different secretaries of state."
It was incorporated in the Instructions to the American delegates to
the first Hague Conference, and has had the endorsement of the
Institute of International Law5 and of much authoritative opinion.
The British unwillingness, however, to surrender such a formidable
weapon is perfectly comprehensible. 6
Private enemy property in conquered territory having reached in
principle the status of immunity from confiscation, a fortiori private
enemy property found in one's own territory on the outbreak of war
should enjoy similar immunity. It is only on the implied assent of
nations, however,-at least, up to the first Hague Conference-and
on a uniformity of modern practice, that a rule of international law to
this effect can be predicated. In ancient times, doubtless such prop-
1 Bentwich. The Law of Private Property in War (London, i9o7) xo. On the
rigor of the Roman law, see L. 51 D. de acqu. rer. dom. I, 12, par. D. de captiv.
'See Articles 2o-22 of the Instructions for the Government of the Armies of
the United States in the Field, General Orders No. ioo.
"Treaty with Prussia, Sept. io, 1785, art. 23, 2 Malloy, Treaties, 1484; treaty
with Italy, Feb. 26, 1871, art 12, 1 Malloy, 972 (covering all enemy goods, not
contraband).
' See 7 Moore, Digest of Int. Law, sec. 1198.
'Annuaire, x877, p. 138.
'Excellent accounts of the British point of view may be found in Hall, It.
Law (6th ed.) 437 ff. and Bentwich, op. cit. 79 ff.
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erty was confiscable, and some modem dicta support the bare power
to confiscate.
Article 41 of Magna Carta tempered the Draconian rule of confis-
cation by a grant of immunity to the goods of foreign merchants,
subject to reciprocity.7 On the continent, however, the rule of
immunity has been more unreservedly accepted in theory and in
practice8 than it has been in England and in the United States, where,
until the early part of the nineteenth century, occasional judicial dicta
may be found sustaining the power in theory if not in practice, though
since that time its exercise has become obsolete. In Ware v. Hylton,"
in discussing a Virginia statute of 1777 confiscating the debts due by
Americans to British subjects, Justice Chase said: "It appears to me
that every nation at war with another is justified by the general and
strict law of nations to seize and confiscate all movable property of its
enemy (of any kind or nature whatever) wherever found, whether
within its territory or not." A dictum of Marshall, C.J. in Brown v.
The United States0 is to the same effect. Partly on the strength of
these cases, some American and English writers have admitted the
power of the State to confiscate enemy private property, though
pointing out the obsolescence of its exercise and condemning the
practice." Wilson, J. in the Ware case characterizes the confiscation
of debts-and other property is not distinguishable in principle-as
"disreputable." Chancellor Kent 2 considered it a "naked and impol-
itic right, condemned by the enlightened conscience and judgment of
modern times." The only two instances of its exercise in the nine-
teenth century are that of Denmark in 1807 confiscating private debts
"And if such (merchants) are found in our land at the beginning of the war,
they shall be detained, without injury to their bodies or goods, until information
be received by us... how the merchants of our land found in the land at war
with us are treated; and if our men are safe there, the others shall be safe in
our land." See McKechnie, Magna Carta, 464 ff.
82 Rivier, Principes du Droit des Gens (Paris, 1896) 318. Heffter, Das
europiiische V6Ikerrecht (8th ed. by Geffcken) "287.
9 (1798, U. S.) 3 Dall. i99. See the note of the editor on this and other cases
in Scott's Cases on International Law, 486-488.
'0 (1814, U. S.) 8 Cranch, iio, Scott's Cases, 486. See also Miller v. United
States (187o, U. S.) ii Wall. 268, to the effect that constitutionally Congress has
the power to confiscate enemy property under the express grant of power to
"make rules respecting captures on land or water."
'Wheaton, Elements of Int. Law (5th Eng. el. by Phillipson) 417 ff. Hall,
op. cit., 431 says such property "may be said to enjoy a practical immunity from
confiscation," but he adds that "it would be unsafe to declare that [confiscation]
is not generally within the bare rights of war." Dr. Lushington in The Johanna
Emilie (1854, Adm.) Spink's Prize Cases 12, 14, said: "If the property was on
land, according to the ancient law, it was also seizable .... That rigour was
afterwards relaxed. I believe no such instance has occurred from the time of
the [Revolutionary] war to the present day."
121 Commentaries, 64.
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due to British subjects as a measure of retorsion, 3 and the Confed-
erate Act of 1861, an act, generally condemned, 4 of a desperate
belligerent body, straining every possible power, and not of a regu-
larly constituted State. We may regard as special penal statutes the
Acts of Congress of I86I and 1862 (12 St. at L. 319 and 589) which
undertook, as a punishment for what was deemed to be treason, to
confiscate the property of those persons actively engaged in the Rebel-
lion. Thus confiscation may now be regarded as entirely obsolete ih
practice and condemned in theory by universal public opinion. A
Hague convention of 1899 categorically provides that "private prop-
erty cannot be confiscated."' 5 The practice of confiscating enemy
ships in port at the outbreak of war persisted longer than the confis-
cation of terrestrial property, but since the Crimean War no instance
of its exercise is known. Modern naval codes and the Hague con-
ventions alike have abolished the privilege of confiscation.'6
The Alien Property Custodian on November 14, 1917, published in
the Official Bulletin 7 the following announcement:
"The purposes of Congress are to preserve enemy owned property
in the United States from loss and to prevent every use of it which
may be hostile and detrimental to the United States. The duty of
the Alien Property Custodian is to protect the property of all owners
under legal disabilities to act for themselves. When a license to
permit enemy owned business is not granted, the Alien Property
Custodian exercises the authority of a common law trustee; there is
no thought of a confiscation or dissipation of property thus lield
in trust."
Whatever disposition may, therefore, be made of the private enemy
property now under sequestration in the United States, it is hardly
likely that it will be confiscated.
E. M. B.
'!This is explained by Latifi, Effects of War on Property (London, i9og) as
"justified by the gravest provocation to an unoffending nation. In time of peace,
the British fleet had swooped upon the Danish ships of war and made them its
prey, and when, in consequence, war broke out, an Order of Council condemned
all the Danish vessels found within British waters as droits of admiralty" (p. 47).
Lord Ellenborough in Wolff v. Oxhoim (1817, K B.) 6 M. & S. 92, Scott's Cases,
496, said of the Danish act, "that the practice of Europe in refraining from the
confiscation of debts had become so general that confiscation must be considered
as a violation of the public faith." See also Hangar v. Abbott (1867, U. S.) 6
Wall. 532, Scott's Cases, 5oo.
"'See Lord Russell to Acting Consul Cridland, (1862) 62 State Papers, No. i,
io8, quoted by Hall, op. cit. 434.
"Hague Convention VI of 19o7, arts. 1-5, Wheaton, op. cit., 422-424 But see
The Chile (1914, P.) 31 T. L. Rep. 3 and The M~we (914, P.) 31 T. L. Rep. 46.
" Second Convention, art. 46.
'
TNovember 14, 1917, No. x59, i.
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THE FUNCTION OF WRITS OF PROHIBITION
The recent case of State ex rel. Cleveland Telephone Co. v. Court
of Common Pleas (1918, Ohio) 12o N. E. 335 raises an interesting
problem concerning limitations upon the use of the writ of prohibition.
When the constitution of Ohio was revised recently a provision was
inserted authorizing the Supreme Court of the state to issue writs
of prohibition. In doing this Ohio followed the example of a large
number of the states. Provisions of this kind have led to an inter-
esting development in the use of what was in its origin purely a
common law writ. The early history of the relations of the courts of
common law and equity is, as is well known, filled with the struggle
between them for supremacy, the common law court trying by various
means, including the issuance of writs of prohibition in certain cases,
to prevent the chancellor from gaining the upper hand. 'That equity
ultimately triumphed is also well known. It is extraordinarily inter-
esting, therefore, to find that under such constitutional provisions as
are mentioned above the supreme courts of some states hold that the
writ of prohibition may be used by them to keep the courts of general
original equity jurisdiction in their respective states within their
powers.' This is of course only a common sense extension of the
writ, rendered possible and natural by the judicial organization of
the states -concerned, under which the same courts administer both
"common-law law" and "equity law."
In the principal case it was sought to take advantage of the grant
to the Supreme Court of Ohio of the power to issue the writ, under
the following circumstances. The city of Cleveland had sought in
the Court of Common Pleas-a court of general original equity juris-
diction-an injunction to restrain the Cleveland Telephone Company
from charging rates higher than those fixed in a city ordinance.
Apparently the real question involved was whether jurisdiction, i. e.,
power, to fix such rates rested with the city council or with the state
Public Utilities Commission.2 At the time the injunction was asked
a proceeding was being carried on before the Commission to deter-
mine the reasonableness of a schedule of rates-higher, be it noted,
than those fixed by the city-filed with the Utilities Commission by the
Telephone Company. That company as relator now applied to the
'People v. District Court (1899) 26 Colo. 386, 58 Pac. 604; State v. District
Court (i9o2) 29 Colo. 277, 68 Pac. 224; State v. Aloe (1899) 152 Mo. 466, 58 S.
W. 494;State v. Woods (1899) i55 Mo. 425, 56 S. W. 474.
'Technically speaking, the issue was whether the city council of Cleveland had
power to fix the rates to be charged by the Telephone Company; but it seems that
that depended upon whether the power had constitutionally been taken from the
city council and lodged in the state Public Utilities Commission. Broadly
speaking, therefore, the issue was as stated in the text.
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Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Court of
Common Pleas from going on with the injunction proceeding. The
Company's argument seems to have been. that under the state law the
Utilities Commission had "exclusive jurisdiction" over the subject of
rates to be charged by public service companies, and that therefore
the Court of Common Pleas had no "jurisdiction." This argument
was- based upon the law creating the Utilities Commission, especially
a section of it which provided that no court other than the Supreme
Court of the state should have authority to "review, suspend or delay
any order made by the [public utilities] commission, or enjoin,
restrain, or interfere with the commission or any member thereof in
the performance of official duties." The Supreme Court refused the
writ on grounds which to the present writer seem entirely sound, but
which were criticized severely by both Wanamaker, J., in his opinion
concurring in the result and Jones, J., who dissented.8
It is elementary learning for which no authority need be cited that
the function of the writ of prohibition is in general to keep courts of
inferior jurisdiction from acting "without jurisdiction" or "in excess
of jurisdiction."' The question presented to the Supreme Court of
Ohio, therefore, was, whether the Court of Common Pleas had juris-
"See also (1918) 17 MicH. L. Rw. 165, for a comment approving the
,criticisms of the majority by Wanamaker and Jones, JJ., in so far as they argue
that the Supreme Court should in the prohibition proceeding have determined
the question of what body had power to fix public utility rates. Both Wana-
maker, J., and the writer in the MIfcniGAN LAw RVmw interpret the decision
of the majority of the court to be that as the Court of Common Pleas is a court
-of general jurisdiction it had power to pass upon its own jurisdiction and that
therefore the writ of prohibition would not be issued. The present writer does
-not so understand the decision of the majority. In spite of certain ambiguous
passages in the opinion, the real decision seems to be that the Court of Common
Pleas had jurisdiction to determine whether the city council had the power tofix the rates in question. The ambiguous passages referred to seem to assert no
more than that where the inferior court has general jurisdiction over the subject
matter involved in a suit, it has jurisdiction to pass upon other jurisdictional
questions that may arise. Even if we criticize this view as unsound, it seems
cledr that the Supreme Court ought not in the prohibition proceeding to do more
-than pass upon the jurisdiction of the lower court in regard to the controversy
in question.
'The two phrases are both commonly used and are doubtless accurate enough
if carefully defined. Unfortunately that is not always done, and as the word
"jurisdiction" is used in legal discussions in more than one sense, it results that
at times the writ of prohibition is perverted into taking the place of a writ of
error or an appeal. This is especially likely to happen in dealing with the
"jurisdiction" of "courts of equity," as equity lawyers are in the habit of saying
that "equity has no jurisdiction" to do certain things when all that is meant is
that according to settled principles equitable relief cannot be had. See the
discussion of this point by the present writer in (i9x5) 15 CoLumAu L. RBV.
io6-107.
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diction to adjudicate the controversy submitted to it, which in turn
was, whether the city council or the Public Utilities Commission had
power to fix the rates to -be charged by the Telephone Company.5
The Common Pleas, therefore, in entertaining the injunction suit was
not attempting to "exercise jurisdiction" over [i. e., jurisdiction to
fix] public utility rates, but merely to settle what body did have that
power.
As the Common Pleas was a court of general jurisdiction it had
the power to pass upon the rate-fixing powers of the city council and
so of the Commission unless the statute quoted above took it away.
Note that the Utilities Commission had entered as yet no order, and
that the equity suit made no attempt to enjoin or otherwise interfere
with its members. As the present writer reads the opinion of the
majority of the Ohio court, they held that the Common Pleas had
jurisdiction to pass upon the point of law thus raised by the injunction
proceeding and therefore that 'the writ of prohibition would not be
granted.6
Mr. Justice Wanamaker, who concurred in the result only,7 criti-
cized the opinion of the majority in a vigorous opinion in which he
took the view that it was the duty of the Supreme Court in the prohi-
bition proceeding to determine the relative powers of city and Com-
mission in fixing rates.8 It is difficult to follow him in arguing that
it was within the function of the Supreme Court, in a prohibition
proceeding directed against the Court of Common Pleas and so
adapted to raise only one question,--viz., the jurisdiction, i. e., the
judicial powers, of that court,-to pass upon the totally different
question of the quasi-legislative rate-fixing power of the city council
Cf. note 2, supra.
The confusion which lies in the discussion by the dissenting member of the
court appears in the following quotation: 'Whether prohibition can be invoked
in this case depends upon the decisive question, Which of these contending
tribunals has jurisdiction over the rates of this public utility, the common pleas
court or the public utilities commission of the state." [The italics are those of
the present writer.] Note that the phrase "jurisdiction over rates" is ambiguous.
The Common Pleas asserted no "jurisdiction over rates," i.e, did not claim that
it could fix or alter the rates of public utilities; it merely asserted that it had the
judicial power or jurisdiction to settle whether the city council of Cleveland had
the rate-fixing power, and incidentally thereto to pass upon the rate-making
power of the Utilities Commission in a proceeding which did not fall within the
letter, at least, of the statute forbidding any court other than the Supreme Court
to review orders of the Commission or to enjoin or otherwise interfere with its
members.
On the ground that under the "home rule" provisions of the Ohio constitution
the city of Cleveland had a power conferred upon it to fix the rates of local public
utilities and an immunity from having this power taken away by anything short
of a constitutional amendment.
*For his conclusions upon that point, see the preceding note.
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or Utilities Commission.9 It seems to the present writer that a pro-
hibition proceeding, the purpose of which was to determine whether
a lower judicial tribunal had power to adjudicate a given controversy,
could not without confusion have been perverted to the totally dif-
ferent purpose of bringing before the Supreme Court of the state an
entirely distinct question, viz., whether the city council or the Utilities
Commission had the rate-fixing power. In that question the Court of
Common Pleas, against which the writ of prohibition was asked, had
no interest unless it had jurisdiction to pass upon it-as indeed the
majority decided it had. If-as the dissenting judge claimed-the
Common Pleas had no power to adjudicate that question, the writ
should issue, but there the prohibition proceeding ought to come to an
end. However desirable it was to get the important matter of the
location of the rate-fixing power before the court of last resort as
quickly a possible, it is difficult to see how anything but confusion
could or would result from using a writ of prohibition for that
purpose.
W. W. C.
COMPETITION OF TROLLEYS AND UNLICENSED JITNEYS
The rapid spread of the jitney-the automobile passenger carrier-
within the last few years has necessitated the regulation of the jitney
business. It is now usual to require that the "jitneur," under pain
of fine or imprisonment, procure a license before he commences busi-
ness. Many states also have the requirement that he furnish a surety
company bond conditioned for the payment of all damages for
personal injuries caused by him.1 Such regulations are obviously
intended, primarily, to benefit the public which uses the highway and
not the trolley company, to whom the jitney has proven a most serious
competitor. May the trolley company take advantage of such penal
provisions to prevent the operation of unlicensed jitneys? The case
of Puget Sound Traction Light & Power Company v. Grassmayer
(1918, Wash.) 173 Pac. 504 holds that it may do so by injunction.2
It would be idle to assert that penal statutes do not affect the rights,
'Apparently the Utilities Commission was not a party to the injunction pro-
ceeding. If not, it would, under the usual rules as to parties, not be a party
to the prohibition proceeding. In that the only parties would be the Court of
Common Pleas and the parties to the injunction proceeding, the hearing of which
it was sought to prohibit.
'Cases dealing with such regulations are collected in L. R. A. i915F 840;
L. R. A. 19i6B 1156; L. IL A. I9i8B 912; and Ann. Cas. I917C 1051.
2 For complete statement of facts, see -Recent Case Notes, infra. This case
is in accord with Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Rapid Transit Co. (I915) 133 Tenn.
99, I79 S. W. 635, L. R. A. i9x6B II43, Ann. Cas. 19i7C 1045.
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privileges, powers and immunities of the individual. One reason for
being a citizen of a country is to obtain that country's protection
against the marauder and the criminal. Yet because the individual
may register his complaint of a breach of a penal statute with 
the
proper prosecutor, it does not follow that he himself may rush 
into
court for civil relief. It is always necessary to guard against 
the
busybody.8 This is well done under ordinary principles 
of equity.
Equity has no criminal jurisdiction, and unless there is special and
pecuniary damage to the individual, equity will not interfere 
to
enforce a valid penal statute," nor to prevent the enforcement 
of an
invalid penal statute.5 Yet the exception is well recognized 
and
equity will not stop in the enforcement of personal and property
rights simply because a crime is involved.
6 The enforcement of penal
provisions is not a ground of equity jurisdiction, but may be incidental
to some recognized ground of such jurisdiction.
The Grassmcayer case accordingly bases on two grounds its decision
that the trolley company may obtain an injunction prohibiting jitney
operation by those who have not furnished bonds in compliance 
with
state law: (i) that since defendants were carrying on business ille-
gally, they were maintaining a public nuisance and might, therefore,
be enjoined by any one suffering special injury thereby; and (2) that
defendants' operation of an illegal business was a violation of plain-
tiff's franchise. The first ground is an extension to the situation
before the court of the general rule of the common law that where
a given state of facts constitutes a public nuisance a civil action for
damages or for an injunction may be brought by any private person
who suffers from it "special and particular damage which is not
experienced in common with other citizens."
7  This principle is
'In Connecticut there was a statute requiring an administrator in default in
filing an inventory to forfeit $20 a month to anyone suing therefor. 
This
-penalty was recovered in Atwood v. Lockwood (1904) 76 Conn. 555, 57 Atl.
279, whereupon plaintiff instituted so many suits that the Legislature was 
forced
to repeal the statute. See Atwood v. Buckingham (i95) 78 Conn. 423, 62 Atl.
616.
'See Tiede v. Schneidt (1898) 99 Wis. 2oi, 74 N. W. 798 and authorities
cited in note 6, infra.
5Denton v. McDonald (1911) io4 Tex. 206, 135 S. W. 848, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.)
453 with note; Hall v. Dunn (i9o8) 52 Ore. 475, 97 Pac. 81i, 25 L. R. A.(N. S.) 193. The Washington cases are contra, however. City Cab etc. Co.
v. Hayden (8913) 73 Wash. 24, i3i Pac. 472, L. R. A. 1I5F 726, Ann. Cas.
1914D 731; Huntworth v. Tanner (19,5) 87 Wash. 670, 852 Pac. 523, Ann. Cas.
1917D 676.
'Re Debs (1894) i58 U. S. 564, 593, 15 Sup. Ct. 90o; Vegelahn v. Guntner
(I896) i67 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077; Hamilton Brown Shoe Co. v. Lally (x895)
131 Mo. 212, 32 S. W. iio6; Pomeroy, Equitable Remedies, sec. 476.
TCranford v. Tirrell (i89i) 128 N. Y. 348, 28 N. E. 5'4; Burdick, Torts
(3d ed.) 464.
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reaffirmed by the Washington statutes.8 To be applicable it requires
a holding that the operation of an unlicensed jitney is a public nui-
sance. As the "jitneur" operating without a license is using the
public highways for purposes not sanctioned by the law, so to hold
seems not an undue extension of the rules as to public nuisances upon
highways.9
The other ground given for the decision seems really to assume
the answer to the question at issue rather than to furnish a reason
upon which an argument can be based. To say that the defendant's
operation of an illegal business is a violation of the plaintiff's fran-
chise is merely to assert in general rather than specific terms that the
defendant is violating a right of the plaintiff's-but that is the thing
to be proved. Granted that, as the court said, "the franchise is
property and any unlawful interference therewith is actionable," we
still need to know just what this so-called "property" is and how
it can be "interfered with," lawfully or unlawfully. It is obvious
that in calling the franchise "property" the court did not use the
term to indicate a physical object, as the "interference" by the
defendant did not include any acts done upon the plaintiff's tracks.
Upon analysis the "franchise" of the plaintiff to lay tracks, operate
trolley cars, etc., upon the public highways is seen to be a complex
aggregate of jural relations 0 consisting, inter alia, of: (i) privileges
against people generally to do these things;" (2) rights against
people generally1 2 that they shall not interfere with the doing of these
things.13 Not being an "exclusive franchise" it does not include
rights that other duly licensed persons shall refrain from doing sim-
ilar things, or an immunity from having similar franchises granted to
other persons by the state. The real question, therefore, is, whether
such a "franchise" ought to be held to include rights against
unlicensed persons that they refrain from competing with the plain-
tiff. Ultimately this question must be decided on grounds of policy
which the use of vague language can only serve to conceal.
Within certain limits the problem is similar to that which arises
'Rem. Code, sees. 943, 944, 8316.
'Cf. Commonwealth v. Allen (I892) 148 Pa. St. 358; also cases holding that
if a public nuisance unreasonably diverts custom from plaintiff's place of busi-
ness, he may sue. Flynn v. Taylor (18gi) 127 N. Y. 596, 28 N. E. 418; Burdick,
OP. cit., 465.
" The word "franchise" at times is used to denote the operative facts-the
grant by the state-and to connote the resulting jural relations. As used in the
text it denotes the jural relations resulting from the grant.
' "Multital," rather than "paucital," according to the terminology of the late
Professor Hohfeld. Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning (1917) 2*6 YALE LAw JourAL, 710, 718.
"' Multital" rights, therefore, commonly called rights in rem.
",Except, of course, upon some privileged occasion.
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when an easement or a profit 6 prendre is granted. Such a grant
confers upon the grantee a complex aggregate of jural relations. As
against the general owner of the property in question the grantee
acquires privileges to enter upon the land and do certain acts thereon,
as well as rights against the owner that he shall refrain from inter-
fering with the doing of the privileged acts. Does the law also confer
upon the grantee rights against third persons that they shall refrain
from acts which will prevent or interfere with the doing of the privi-
leged acts? The instrument granting the easement or profit is of
course silent upon the question. It remains for the law to attach to
the grant such jural relations as sound policy indicates. There is
authority for the proposition that the resulting easement or profit does
include the suggested rights against third persons.1 The analogy
to the case in hand is strikingly close if we assume that the grantor
of the easement or profit reserves the privilege and power of granting
similar rights, etc., to others, i. e., that the easement or profit is not
"exclusive.' 5
On the whole, considerations of policy seem to the present writer
to be in favor of the result reached by the court in the principal case.
It is desirable that public utilities be operated efficiently. This is
hardly to be expected if they are exposed to unlimited competition
with irresponsible persons. To permit them to bring suits to prevent
such competition, as well as to permit a representative of the public
to institute criminal prosecutions or (in some jurisdictions) injunc-
tion proceedings, seems therefore a sound rule. And a similar result
was reached in Farmers' & Merchants' Co-op. Tel. Co. z. Boswell
Tel. Co. (1918, Ind.) 119 N. E. 513, in which an injunction was
granted at the instance of a licensed telephone company, whose fran-
chise was not exclusive, against an unlicensed company. In that case
the unlawful construction by the defendant of poles and lines on the
public highway even more clearly constituted a public nuisance.
ADVERSE POSSESSION BY TRUSTEE UNDER TRUST VOID AS A
PERPETUITY: DOES IT ENVRE TO SUPPOED
CESTUI BY ESTOPPEL?
An interesting problem which is somewhat unique in legal history,
is presented by a case which has come three times before the Mary-
land Court of Appeals and now awaits solution on the fourth appeal.
"Wilson v. Mackreth (1766) 3 Burr. 1824; Fitzgerald v. Firbank [1897] 2
Ch. 96.
The language in the easement and profit cases suggests the possibility that
if the grant were not exclusive it would confer what is commonly called a mere
"license' and that therefore the grantee would not acquire these rights against
third persons. Cf., however, Hohfeld, Faulty Analysis in Easement and License
Cases ('9,7) 27 YALE LAw JouRNAL, 66, 92-W.
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American Colonization Society v. Soulsby (1917) 129 Md. 6o5, 99 AUt.
944, L. R. A. 19I7C 937; S. C. (1917) 31 Md. 296, 1o Atl. 78o; s. c.
(i918) 1o4 AUt. 12o. One Mrs. Donovan executed a declaration of
trust in 1886 of certain real estate in Baltimore. After reciting that
she intended the American Colonization Society to have the benefit of
the real estate to the extent of the declaration of trust, and to become
possessed of a vested interest in the property beyond peradventure, she
declared that she held the property in trust for herself for life, and
after her death in trust for Latrobe and Harvey and their heirs, in
trust to pay the net income to the American Colonization Society for
the transportation of colored persons to Liberia, or if the net income
was not thus exhausted, for public schools for the education of colored
children in Liberia. This was a declaration of a trust upon a trust
upon a use. Mrs. Donovan died in March, i89o, leaving a will.
Upon her death the trustees filed their petition in the Circuit Court of
Baltimore, alleging the declaration of trust and asking the court to
supervise the execution of the trust. The Society filed its answer
and the court made its order assuming supervision of the trust and
directing the trustees to report annually. The trustees took posses-
sion and have collected the rents and paid the net income for 27 years
under the terms of the deed to the American Colonization Society.
More than 2o years after the death of Mrs. Donovan her heirs and
residuary devisees filed a bill against the trustees and the society to
have the deed of trust set aside on various grounds, among others
because it violated the rule against perpetuities as established in Mary-
land. The court held that the declaration of trust was void as attempt-
ing to create an active trust with no time limit. In Maryland, an
active trust of unlimited or indefinite duration even for charitable uses
is held to be one form of perpetuity. The bill of the heirs was, how-
ever, dismissed, and the heirs were held barred from recovery because
of the adverse possession of the trustees for 27 years, 2o years being
the period of adverse possession.
The Colonization Society then filed a bill against the trustees
demanding the corpus of the trust property, and the State also filed
a bill against the trustees claiming the property as escheated to the
State. Both of these bills were dismissed. It was held that the prop-
erty was not escheat for two reasons :-in the first place, Mrs. Dono-
van did not die without heirs; and in the second place, she did leave a
will with a residuary clause.'
Since the declaration of trust was void, because transgressing a
fundamental rule of the policy of the State, the Colonization Society
could not claim any benefit from the fact that it was named as bene-
ficiary in the Donovan deed. The deed did convey to the trustees a
I1o R. C. L. 6o4.
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legal estate, but the beneficial interest sought to be created under it
was void. Hence, the possession of the premises by the trustees was
in no manner the possession of the petitioning society. The petition
of the society for the transfer of the entire corpus of the estate was
therefore dismissed.
The question remains and is now pending on appeal whether the
trustees take for their own benefit by adverse possession, subject only
to a moral obligation to carry out the trust, or whether their adverse
possession enures to the benefit of the Society, giving it a right to the
income if not-to the corpus.
It is argued by the Society that the trustees are estopped from set-
ting up the claim that the Society has no interest under the trust;
that the trustees, having gotten their possession under the deed, be it
void or valid, and having held under claim of trusteeship for the
Society, are in no position to deny that the Society for whose benefit
they got the possession, has no interest. The cases of Board v. Board
2
and Hansen v. Johnson3 are cited in support of this contention.
As is pointed out in an article by the present writer in the January
number of this JOURNAL, - the recognition of an interest in a third per-
son by an adverse possessor does not necessarily make his possession
enure to the benefit of such third person. Such a case as Board v.
Board has no application to uphold an estoppel of one who claims
titie under an invalid instrument. A clear distinction is drawn by the
English cases between an estoppel arising from adverse possession
under a devise or grant valid as a conveyance of a defective or pos-
sessory title, and that under a devise or grant invalid as an instrument
of conveyance. 5 It is a general rule that an adverse claimant does not
take a greater estate than he claims; but in this case the trustees
were claiming a fee as against the heirs and devisees of Mrs. Donovan,
on behalf of the trust. This is sufficient to bar their claim to posses-
sion, at least while the trust continues.8
The result would seem to be that the trustees acquire title by adverse
possession subject only to a moral obligation to account to the Society.
It has been suggested, however, in a learned note in the MINNESOTA
LAw REviEW,7 that the court should have disregarded the direction
for perpetual active duties by the trustees and compelled a transfer
2 (i873) L. R. 9 Q. B. 48.
8 (1883) 62 Md. 25.
'(1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 219, 228.
'See also Bomar z. Stephens (1848, Tenn.) 9 Humph. 546; Re Stringer's
Estate (i877) 6 Ch. D. iio; Re Anderson [1905] 2 Ch. 70.
' (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOUTRNAL,2--, 222. See also Churcher v. Martin (i889)
42 Ch. D. 312; Yardley v. Holland (I875) 2o Eq. 428, 440, 44i; Re Lacey [i8g9]
2 Ch. i49; Lightwood, Time Limit on Actions, 82.
(I919) 3 MiN,. L. REv. 39.
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of a legal title to the Society; thus disregarding the invalid restraints
on the donation and sustaining the gift, instead of destroying the gift
along with the restraints. It is difficult, however, to achieve this
result, as the donor intended an active trust instead of a direct gift
to the charitable corporation.
The strongest claim of the Society would seem to be that the
trustees by filing their petition as such and by undertaking the trust
under the direction of the court and under its decree of i89o, have
declared themselves trustees for the Society. The difficulty is that
this declaration of trust also being without any time limit would be
void under the peculiar Maryland rule that a perpetual provision by
way of trust running to remote generations, even in favor of charity,
is a kind of perpetuity. The implied declaration of trust by the
trustees therefore fails, unless there is some estoppel against the trus-
tees to set up the rule against perpetuities, or unless they are bound
by the decree of i89o. Such estoppel can hardly give the Society all
that the invalid instrument under which the trustees held purported
to give it. It might, however, preclude the trustees from repudiating
the trust for a reasonable time. A court of equity might well assume
jurisdiction to prescribe due limits upon the duration of the trust in
accordance with the policy of the State, thus upholding the charitable
trust so far as possible. The trustees may thus be estopped to set up
the rule against perpetuities, not by the mere fact that they acquired
title claiming under a void instrument, but by the fact of their accept-
ance of the trust under the direction and orders of the court. Under
these circumstances it may be that the State alone can object on the
ground of a perpetuity. If the court should prescribe a definite limit
for the duration of the trust, there would be a resulting trust thereafter
in favor of the residuary devisees, on the theory that the trustees held
adversely to the devisees only on behalf of the trust, and their title
is established by adverse possession only to the extent of their claim.,
The failure on the part of' the trustees to perform the trust would
work a fraud upon the testatrix and her devisees, as well as upon the
Society. A constructive trust or estoppel should then be recognized
in favor of the charitable institution to the extent or for the time
which the law in general permits, with a resulting trust thereafter in
favor of the heirs or residuary devisees. 9
H. W. BALLANTINE.
Urbana, Ill.
'Ricard v. Williams (1822, U. S.) 7 Wheat. 59; (Igig) 28 YALE LAw
JOURNAL, 220.
' See by way of analogy, Winder v. Scholey (igio) 83 Ohio St. 2o4, 93 N. E.
Io98, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 995; Amherst College v. Ritch (I897) I51 N. Y. 282,
45 N. E. 876; Girard Trust Co. v. Russell (igio, C. C. A. 3d) 179 Fed. 446.
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THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
The rule of Anglo-American law that the ordinary statute of liml-
tations is procedural in character and is determined therefore in the
conflict of laws exclusively by the law of the forum, is so firmly estab-
lished that we are apt to regard it as the universal rule. Such a con-
clusion, however, would be very far from the truth. There is perhaps
no .problem in the conflict of laws with respect to which the courts
and writers of the different countries of the world are more strongly
divided. In the light ofthis fact a decision of the Court of Appeals
of Milan of March 23, 1916, is of especial interest. Sala v. Model,
2 Rivista di diritto commerciale, 1916, 896.1 Action was brought for
the breach of a contract which had been entered into in England.
The action was barred under the Italian statute of limitations but
not under the English statute. The court held that the English statute
must yield on grounds of policy to the Italian statute.
There are two principal systems with reference to the general ques-
tion-the Anglo-American and the continental. The former looks at
the question fundamentally as one of procedure ;2 the latter as one
affecting the substantive rights of the parties. The Anglo-American
rule follows the rule laid down by the Dutch writers on the conflict of
laws of the seventeenth century.3 The continental rule, on the other
hand, represents the older and more general4 view. The Anglo-
American rule is simple and leads always to the application of the
law of the forum; the question is only, whether it brings about just
results. Under the continental view, on the other hand, the problem
arises at the outset whether the rules determining the statute of limi-
tations in the conflict of laws should be the same as the rule governing
'The court rested its decision on Art. 12 of the Preliminary Dispositions of
the Civil Code, which provides that the foreign legislation shall not be applied in
the face of laws touching in any respect the public policy of the forum.
"LeRoy v. Crowninshield (182, C. C. Mass.) '2 Mason, i5i, Fed. Cas. No.
8269; M'Elmoyle v. Cohen (1839, U. S.) 13 Pet. 312; Townsend V. Jemison
(I85o, U. S.) 9 How. 407. See also 48 L. IL A. 625, 6 L. R_ A. (N. S.) 658;(9x8) 27 YALE LAW JoURNAL, io78; Dicey, Conflict of Laws (2d ed.), rule i93;
Minor, Conflict of Laws, 52; Story, Conflict of Laws (8th ed.), 793; Westlake,
Private International Law (sth ed.), 328; Wharton, Conflict of Lawt (3d ed.),
1244-1245.
The law of the forum applies though the parties lived in the foreign jurisdiction
until the statute had taken effect. Thompson v. Reed (1883) 75 Me. 404;
Bulger v. Roche (1831, Mass.) ii Pick. 36; Power v. Hathaway (1864, N. Y. Sup.
Ct.) 43 Barb. 214.
'Paul Voet was the first to break with the traditional view. Ad statutis, s. o,
n. I. He was followed by Huber (Praelectiones juris civilis, pt. 2, bk. I, tit 3, n.
7) and by John Voet (Ad Pandektas, bk. 44, tit. 3, n. 12).
"Bartolus and the Conflict of Laws (Beale's translation) No. i9. Bartolus
applied in the matter of contracts the law of the place of performance. Ibid.
see also Michel, La prescription lib6ratoire en droit international priv, 26 ff.
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the substantive rights of the parties in general or whether a special
rule should apply. If the former viewpoint is the correct one, dif-
ferent results will be obtained in the different countries corresponding
to the differences in the rules adopted by them in the conflict of laws,
with reference to the. substantive rights of the parties. In the matter
of contracts there is the greatest variety of view in this regard.
As regards the limitation of actions arising out of contracts, the
Belgian courts say that the law of the domicile of the debtor controls. 5
The French courts have been in the habit of expressing it in the same
manner. 6  In these cases the lex domicilii coincided, however, gen-
erally either with the lex loci contractus or with the lex fori. Most of
the French courts expressly adopt the law of the place of contracting.7
Some accept the law of the place of performance as the governing
law.' A considerable number, even, support the law of the forum. 9
The Italian courts have consistently held that the statute of limitations
is controlled by the law applicable to the substance and effect of the
contract.'0 Contracts falling within the provisions of the Civil Code
are controlled therefore by Article 9 of the Preliminary Dispositions
of the Civil Code," and commercial contracts by Article 58 of the
" Trib. com. Ostend, March 8, 1888, Pandectes belges, 1888, io81. A stipulation
that a foreign law should control was deemed opposed to public policy where theplace of performance was in Belgium. Txib. com. Antwerp, May 30, 1862,
Jurisprudence du port d'Anvers, 1862, I, 373.
' Cass. Jan. 13, 186, D. 69, 1, I35; Trib. Seine, Nov. 28, 1891, Clunet, 1892, p.
712.
App. Alger, Aug. x8, 1848, S. 49, 2, 64; App. Chambry, Feb. 12, 1869, S.
187o, 2, 9; Trib. com. Marseilles, Oct. 25, i88o, 8 Clunet, 259; App. Bordeaux,
March I, 1889, D. 189o, 2, 89; Apr. 27, i89I, ig Clunet, 1OO4; Trib. civ. Seine,
Nov. 14, 189o, ig Clunet, 987; Apr. 3o, 1904, 34 Clunet, 417; Trib. de Tunis, June
15, I89I, 18 Clunet, 1238; Dec. 26, 1898, 25 Clunet, 557; Trib. civ. Marseilles,
Oct. 31, 19o6, 34 Clunet, 416.8App. Paris, March 29, 1836, Journal du Palais, 1835-1836 (3d ed.) 12o6; S.1836, 2, 457; Trib. com. de la Seine, Aug. 3, 1838, affirmed by the court of Paris
Feb. 7, 1839, Journal du Palais, 1839, 1, 298; Trib. com. Marseilles, Dec. 20, 1865,App. Aix, June 20, 1866, Journal de jurisprudence commerciale et maritime, i866,
I, 36; 1867, I, 116; App. Bordeaux, Dec. 26, 1876, S. 1877, 2, io8; Trib. civ. Seine,
Feb. i, 1889, 16 Clunet, 621.
'Cass. Jan. 13, 1869, D. 1869, I, 135; App. Besangon, Jan. 11, 1882, D. 1882, 2,2i1; Trib. civ. Seine, Nov. 28, 789i, 19 Clunet, 712; Dec. 11, 1893, 21 Clunet, 145;App. Rennes, May 20, 1899, 26 Clunet, 998; App. Paris, Nov. 15, 19o6, 3 Darras,
756.
" Encyclopedie, Art. 9, Preliminary Dispositions, No. 174.
'Art. 9 of the Preliminary Dispositions of the Civil Code provides as follows:
"The substance and effect of obligations are deemed to be regulated by the law of
the place in which the acts were done, and, if the contracting parties are foreigners
and belong to the same nationality, by their national law. The showing df adifferent intent is reserved in each case." This article applies also where the
contract was entered into abroad between an Italian and a foreigner. Ency-
clopedie, Art. 9, Preliminary Dispositions, No. 173; Cass. Turin, June 30, 1882,
Cass. Tor. 1882, 2, 215.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Commercial Code. 2 But whether the foreign statute of limitations
would be enforced where the action would have been barred by the
statute of limitations of the forum hgd apparently not been presented
to the Italian courts before the case of Sala v. Model, supra.15
The fundamental rule of Anglo-American law which applies the
law of the forum as regards the limitation of actions, controls only
where the foreign statute bars the action and does not discharge the
obligation of the contract. Where the law of the state governing the
substance of the contract has discharged the obligation of such con-
tract as a result of the running of the statute of limitations, instead
of merely barring the remedy, it is recognized in both England and
the United States that no action will lie, although the suit would not
have been barred under the local statute of limitations of the forum.1 '
This is especially true in the United States where a statute creating a
cause of action specifies the time within which such action must be
brought. Such a provision is regarded as constituting a condition
upon which the cause of action is granted and is controlled therefore
by the law governing the substantive rights of the parties. 5
In a good many of our states the common law rule that the statute
of limitations is subject to the law of the forum has been changed by
statutes, which under certain conditions close the doors of the courts
of the forum with respect to foreign causes of action where the action
is barred by such foreign law.is
The Italian decision referred to above reaches a result similar to
' Art. 58 of the Commercial Code provides as follows: "The form and essential
requisites of commercial obligations, the form of the acts that are necessary for
the exercise and preservation of the rights arising from such obligations or from
their performance, and the effect of the acts themselves, are governed, respec-
tively, by the laws and usages of the place where the obligations are created and
where said acts are done or performed, save in every case the exception laid down
in article 9 of the Preliminary Dispositions of the Civil Code with respect to
those subject to the same national law." To the effect that the domicile of the
debtor controls see Trib. of Rome, Dec. 30, 1871, La Legge 1872, 1, i56; App.
Florence June 16, 1873, Annali, 1873, :2, 474.
In Germany the law of the place of performance governs the obligation of
contracts and is applied also with reference to the statute of limitations.
Reichsgericht, May I8, 188, 2 RG 13; Jan. 17, I880, 6 RG 24.
Art. 52 of the Convention on International Commercial Law concluded at the
Congress of Montevideo provides that "the prescription of personal actions is
governed by the law to which the corresponding obligations are subject."
"Don v. Lippmann (1837, H. L.) 5 CI.'& F. i;'Huber v. Steiner (1835, C. P.)
2 Bing. N. Cas. 2o; Canadian Pac. R. Co. v. Johnston (1894, C. C. A. --d) 61 Fed.
738. See also Dicey, 710; Minor, 523; Story, 804; Westlake, 330; Wharton,
x256.
"See The Harrisburg (1886) ii9 U. S. xi9; Davis v. Mills (1904) x94 U. S.
451. See also 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 687, note. ,
" See notes in48 L. R. A. 639; 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) iog; 51 L. R. A. (N. S.)
96, L. R. A. 1915C, 976; (1p18) 27 YA. LAw JouRNAL, io7&
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the one produced by the statutes just mentioned. But for the fact
that most of the American statutes contain various qualifications of
the principle adopted by them, the result would be identical.
What is the true solution of the problem? That the law of the
forum is free to apply either its own statute of limitations or the
statute of the foreign state there can be, of course, no doubt.
Whether it will apply the one or the other depends solely upon its
own notion of what is right and proper. One of two viewpoints may
be adopted. The question may be looked at in the first place from the
viewpoint of the internal or uniterritorial law of the forum. This
would lead in England and the United States to the application of the
statute of limitations of the forum. Inasmuch as the ordinary stat-
utes of limitation are regarded in this country for purposes of con-
stitutional law, stattitory construction, etc., generally speaking, as
relating to the remedy and not to the obligation of the contract, the
conclusion would be that the question must in the conflict of laws also
be governed by the law of the forum, in accordance with the rule
universally recognized that the lex fori controls the remedy.17  Log-
ically the statute of limitations of the forum would govern without
reference to whether the statute of the place governing the obligation
of the contract was of a shorter or longer duration, or whether the
foreign law regarded its statute of limitations as substantive or
procedural. Most of the continental courts, on the other hand, would
be forced to a different conclusion, because of the fact that "pre-
scription of actions" is regarded by their law as affecting the sub-
stance of the obligation.18
The second viewpoint may be. called, in the language of the
Supreme Court of the United States, the "international" point of
view. In this case the reasoning would take the following form:
As the contract was made in a foreign country it is just and wise
to attach the same legal consequences to the operative facts as is done
in such foreign state by its uniterritorial law. The same policy which
dictates the incorporation of the foreign law of contracts suggests that
the foreign statute of limitations be incorporated likewise. This rule
is preferable to the doctrine which declines to incorporate foreign
statutes of limitations, because it leads internationally to greater
uniformity.
That this second mode of reasoning is more satisfactory than the
"
TWhere the foreign statute of limitations operates as a discharge of the
contract no action will upon principle be allowed anywhere.
'Concerning the nature of prescription from the viewpoint of internationallaw, see Baudry-Lacantinerie & Tissier, De la prescription (3d ed.) 90-91; Sahm,
Die aussergerichtliche Geltendmachung der Veridhrungseinrede. 49 Jherings
Jahrbiicher, 5g ff.; Treutler, Die Veridhrungseinrede im internationalen Privat-
recht, nach heutigem Reichsrecht, 9 ff.
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first would seem to be clear, although it is opposed to the view taken
by our own law. The Anglo-American doctrine admits of an easy
historical explanation. When the question of the conflict of laws
was first presented to English courts towards the middle of the
eighteenth century, the common law had developed for centuries
without foreign influence. It was most natural, therefore, that the
courts should be inclined to restrict the operation of foreign law and
look upon the statute of limitations 'in the conflict of laws as they
were wont to do in their uniterritorial law-as affecting the remedy-
especially since they could find warrant for so doing in the writings
of the Dutch jurists. In regard to penal laws the same narrow atti-
tude was originally taken by the English and American courts. When-
ever a statute was penal in the municipal sense it was so regarded in
the conflict of laws. Both the Privy Council1 and the Supreme
Court of the United States,20 however, realized in the end that a
broader viewpoint should be taken in the conflict of laws, and that
the law of the forum should decline to enforce such foreign laws
only if they are penal in the strict or international sense.
There is no reason, as regards statutes of limitation, either, why
the internal test, which classifies them as procedural or as relating
to the remedy, should be carried over into the conflict of laws. A
right which can be enforced no longer by an action at law is shorn of
its most valuable attribute. After the enforcement of the right of
action is gone under the law governing the rights of the parties, it
would seem clear upon principle that the same consequences should
attach to the operative facts everywhere. Nor is there any policy
pointing to a different conclusion. 21 It follows that no court should
"Huntington v. Attrill (P. C.) [1893] A. C. i5o.
'Huntington v. Attrill (1892) 146 U. S. 657.
'Most of the foreign authors support the view that the law governing the
obligation of the contract should control also the time within which an action on
the contract is barred. Asser, EBments de droit international priv6, 84-85;
Audinet, Principes Rlgmentaires du droit international priv6 (2d ed.) 621;
Cavaretta, La prescrizioni nel diritto internazionale privato, 1O5-io7; Despagnet,
Pricis de .droit international priv6 (5th ed.) 999;_ 3 Diena, Trattato di diritto
commerciale internazionale, 2x8, 223; Fedozzi, 11 diritto processuale civile inter-
nazionale, 539; 2 Jitta, La substance des obligations, 165; 8 Laurent, Le droit civil
international, 36o-361; 4 Lyon-Caen & Renault, Trat de droit commercial (4th
ed.) 571; 2 Meili, Das internationale Civil- und Handelsrecht, 356; Ottolenghi, La
cambiale nel diritto internazionale, 487, 495; Savigny, A treatise on the conflict
of laws (2d ed.) 2o1; Schfffner, Entwickelung des internationalen Privatrechts,
iii; Villalbi, Tratado de derecho mercantil internacional, 422; Vincent & Penaud,
Effets de commerce, No. 114; W~chter, Archiv flr die civilistische Praxis, 411;
4 Weiss, Traiti de droit international priv6 (2d ed.) 406-407, 463.
A few apply the law of the domicile of the debtor. Surville & Arthuys, Cours
0l6mentaire de droit international priv6 (6th ed.) 937; 1 Vareilles-Sommiares,
Synth~se de -droit international privi, 255.
The following authors prefer the law of the forum: Chr~tien, Etude sur la
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enforce a foreign cause of action which is barred by the law governing
the substantive rights of the parties. The fact that either the internal
law of the forum or the internal law of the foreign state or the
internal law of both states may regard statutes of limitation as relat-
ing to the remedy is therefore immaterial. What attitude the foreign
law may take in the conflict of laws with reference to statutes of limi-
tation of other countries is likewise of no consequence, for the law
of the forum should not upon correct principle incorporate the rules
of the conflict of laws of another state.22
Does it follow of necessity that the foreign statute of limitations
must also be incorporated 'where the statute of the forum is the
shorter in duration of the two? In the ordinary language of the courts
the answer would be "yes, unless the enforcement of the foreign
statute is contrary to the public policy of the forum." Upon a more
correct analysis of the real situation this statement means that the
law of the forum may properly decline to incorporate the foreign
statute of limitations, that is, attach identical consequences to the
operative facts as are attached thereto by the foreign law, if some
paramount interest of the forum would be injured thereby. Can it
be said that the statute of limitations of the forum affects such an inter-
est? Suppose that the foreign law had no statute of limitations at
all or, what is more likely to be true in fact, that the period prescribed
by the foreign law is 20 or 3o years, while that of the forum is 6
years, should the courts of the forum enforce the foreign cause of
action after the expiration of 6 years from the time the action
accrued? A proper appreciation of the situation would suggest a
negative answer. The question affects not merely the parties to the
litigation but the interests of the state as a whole. It relates directly
to the administration of justice in the state.23 A limitation of the
lettre de change, 2o7; Labb6, S. 1869, i, 49; Martin, La prescription libiratoire endroit international privi, ig Revue de droit international et de ligislation
comparie, 279; Mittermaier, Ueber die Collision der Processgesetze, 13 Archivffr civilistische Praxis, 307.
Mass6 favors the law of the place of payment i Mas96, Le drait commercial
dane ses rapports avec le droit des gens et le droit civil, No. 599.
=See (igio) io COL. L. REv. , 344; (gi8) 27 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 509.
The same view is held by a considerable number of writers. Aubry, 23
Clunet, 479; 1 Aubry & Rau, Cours de droit civil frangais (5th ed.) I65-I66;
Audinet, Principes ilimentaires du droit international privi (2d ed.) 621;
Baudry-Lacantinerie & Tissier, Traitj de la prescription, Nos. 982, 985; Despagnet
Pricis de droit international priv6 (5th ed.) 999; Valery, Manuel de droit inter-
national privi, 1014-15; 4 Weiss, Traiti de droit international privi (2d ed.) 4o7.
According to Pillet the statute of limitations exists for the protection of thedebtor, whose national law therefore should control. He would apply the
statute of the forum, however, whenever it is of a shorter duration than the
statute of limitations of the national law of the debtor. Principes de droit
international privi, p. 457, note.
In LeRoy v. Crowninshield (I82o, C. C. Mass.) 2 Mason, i5, Fed. Cas. No.
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time within which suit must be brought rests upon the impossibility of
determining a case justly after the lapse of a long period since the
time when the facts occurred. Because of the fallibility of human
memory and the impracticability of preserving all written evidence
concerning business transactions for an indefinite period of time, the
law fixes a period which it deems reasonable under the conditions as
they exist in the particular state or country. The length of the period
granted is intimately connected' with the system of procedure prevail-
ing at the forum. For example, a state in which the procedure is
oral will, in the nature of things, prescribe a shorter statute of limi-
tations than a state which requires the facts to be established by
written evidence. The period prescribed by the statute of limitations
itself defines the maximum time within which, in the estimation of
the legislature of that state, substantial justice can be done in the
particular case under the conditions surrounding the trial of such a
case. This being the reason for the adoption of statutes of limitation,
it follows as a matter of course that the maximum period prescribed
must apply to all causes of action, irrespective of the place where
they may have arisen. The result reached by the Italian court of
appeal is therefore to be approved.
E. G. L.
8269, Story intimated that on principle no action should be allowed if all remedies
were barred by the lex loci contractus, but he appears to have changed his view
later. See Townsend v. Jemison (i85o, U. S.) 9 How. 4o7; Story, Conflict of
Laws (8th ed.), 793.
